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the Massach~usetts Supreme Judicial Court--January Term,
A. -D. 1861.
WHITIORE VS. SOUTH BOSTON IRON COMPANY.

1. Where a contract is made by written correspondence solely, it must be treated
as a contract in writing, not subject to addition or alteration by proof of the acts,
declarations, and intentions of the parties aliunde.
2. But it is competent to show that the parties, subsequent to entering into the
same, consented to waive any of its provisions, and to substitute others in their
stead.
3. But an additional warranty, not expressed, or implied by its terms, that the
article sold is fit for a particular use, cannot be added, either by implication of
law or parol proof.
4. Nor can the question whether such warranty is fairly to be inferred, from the
application of the terms of the written contract to its subject-matter, or from the
attending circumstances, be submitted to the jury; they should be instructed
that no such warranty exists in the case.
5. "A contract to manufacture "retorts like the one before furnished" imports more
than likeness in "size, shape, and exterior form." It has reference to the material and workmanship.
6. Such a contract cannot be controlled by proving a custom in the vicinity of the
transaction, that founders shall not be held to warrant their manufacture, unless
by express contract; or, in case of apparent defects, and the absence of any
express agreement, that they shall have their castings returned in a reasonable
time, and the right to replace them by new ones.
7. The rule of damages for not furnishing manufactured articles according to contract is the -difference in value between those actually furnished, and such as
should have been, unless they were to have been furnished for a particular use.

Contract.- The declaration alleged that the plaintiffs were
formerly partners with William T. Hawes, now deceased, and
engaged with him in the manufacture of coal oil at East Boston;
that, in the early part of 1858, the plaintiffs and Hawes employed
the defendants to manufacture for them eighteen iron retorts, to
be used at their works in East Boston, for the purpose of extracting oil from coal, for the price of $100 each, and the retorts were
manufactured, and the price was paid; that subsequently. the.
retorts were set, and, when applied to use, proved defective and
imperfect in their construction, and began to crack and leak, caus-
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ing not only the loss of the retorts themselves, but a loss of oil,
labor and fuel, an interruption of business, and the expense of
removing the retorts and replacing them with others. The other
facts in the case sufficiently appear by the opinion of the court.
A. A. Banney, for defendants.
J. C. Abbott and 0. Hf. Preston, for plaintiffs.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CHAPMAN, J.-The court are of opinion that the rulings of the
trial were erroneous in several important particulars.
1. The contract between the parties was made in writing, and is
contained in the letter of the defendants to Hawes, and his reply.
As soon as the defendants assented to the modifications stated in
the reply, the contract was complete. In construing the contract,
the Judge ruled that the words, "1like the one furnished you in
February," did not apply to quality, but only to shape, exterior
form, &c. But the Court are of opinion that this.is too restricted
a construction of these words. They do not apply to weight,
because the weight is expressly designated; but they apply to the
material; and this should not only be iron, but the same kind of
iron that was used in the sample referred to; and they also apply
to the quality of the workmanship, which should be like that
referred to. The language implies that the iron shall be merchantable of its kind: Gardinervs. Gray, 4 Camp. 144; S/hepherd vs.
Pybus, 3 Man. & Gr. 868; Chit. Con. 8th Amer. Ed., 450. But
it does not imply that the retorts shall be fit for the particular use
alleged in the declaration. It is only when a party undertakes to
supply an article for a particular use, that he is held to warrant
that it shall be fit and proper for that purpose: Chit. Con. 450,
and cases there cited; Brown vs. Edgington, 2 Man. & Gr. 279;
.Duttonvs. qerrish,9 Cush. 89. When the contract is in writing, an
additional warranty, not expressed or implied by its terms, that the
article is fit for a particular use, cannot be added either by implication of law or by parol proof: Chanter vs. Hopkins, 4 M. & W.
399. The general doctrine, that parol evidence is inadmissible to
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vary or add to a written contract, would exclude the parol proof;
and the ordinary doctrine of construing contracts by adopting the
fair import of the language which the parties have used would
exclude such warranty by implication of law. Some of the cases
cited are also authorities on this point. The question whether
there was such warranty should not have been submitted to the
jury; but they should have been instructed that the contract of
the parties did not contain such warranty.
2. The instructions given to the jury as to the directions given
by Messrs. Hawes & Gessner were incorrect. The reply of
Hawes to the defendants' proposal directed the making of the
retorts "as per memorandum and terms in yours of March 29, and
directions given by myself and Henry Gessner." Such reasonable
directions as he and Gessner might choose to give would come within
this clause, and be binding on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs allege,
as one of their grounds of complaint, that the retorts were cast
horizontally, and in green sand. They offered evidence tending to
show that the retorts were thus cast; that this method of casting
is unusual and improper; that a horizontal casting is much more
liable to cold-shuts, blow-holes, shrink-holes, and other defects;
and that, in a green sand casting, the liability to blow-holes and
shrink-holes is much greater than in a dry sand casting. In reply
to this, the defendants offered evidence tending to show that, when
applied to by Hawes & Gessner, they told them, and that it was
understood mutually, that, if they made them, they should have to
cast them horizontally, as they could not get the necessary fixtures
to cast them vertically in season; that they began to cast them,
and had cast a number horizontally in dry sand, when Hawes &
Gessner desired them faster, and were told by the defendants that
they could not get them out faster, unless they cast them in green
sand, and if so cast they would be more likely to contain blowholes, shrink-holes, &c., and thereupon they ordered the defendants
to cast them in green sand, as they must have them; that seven we
cast in green sand, and horizontally-accordingly, it being impossible to cast them vertically in green sand; that all those cast were
cast horizontally, and some of them in presence of Hawes and
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Gessner, one or both of them, without objection; that they furnished a plan specifying the dimensions and shape and thickness
of the retorts, which was followed by the defendants, as they
claimed, and that the said Gessner examined the retorts.
If casting the retorts horizontally was an unusual and improper
method, such casting would not be a compliance with the contract;
and no conversation which was had prior to the making of the contract would be admissible to vary the writing. The casting in
green sand was also in violation of the written contract, which provides that the casting shall be in dry sand. But Hawes & Gessner might waive a compliance with their obligation to cast the
retorts according to the agreements of the contract; and if, because
they were in baste to get the work completed, or for any other reason satisfactory to them, they did waive their rights in this respect,
and consent that the retorts should be cast horizontally, and in
green sand, the plaintiffs are bound by such waiver and consent.
The amount of their knowledge as to the quality of iron, and as. to
how much better vertical casting is than horizontal casting, or dry
sand casting than green sand casting, is immaterial; and the
instructions on this subject were erroneous. The only question
which was material is, whether they or either of them did, in fact,
direct or give consent to the use of the green sand, and the method
of casting horizontally, as adopted by the defendants.
3. The evidence offered to show that there was in Boston and its
vicinity a custom, that founders should not be held, in the absence
of an express agreement, to warrant their castings against any
latent defects; also, that there was a custom that they should, in
case of apparent defects, and in the absence of any express agreement, be entitled to have the castings returned in a reasonable
time, and a right to replace them with new ones, was properly
rejected. It would be difficult to state a principle which would
reconcile all the numerous decisions that have been made on the
subject of local customs or usages. STORY, J., in the Schooner
1?eeside, 2 Sumn. 569, says: "I rejoice to find that of late years,
the courts of law, both in England and in America, have been disposed to narrow the limits of the operation of such usages and
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customs2 and to discontinue any further extension of them." In
the present case, the usage cannot be considered as forming a
part of the contract.
If the claim of the plaintiffs is found merely in an implied
warranty that the retorts should be fit for the particular use
alleged, the court are of opinion that the action cannot be maintained. If it is to be further prosecuted on the ground that the
contract, as interpreted by the court, has been broken, then the
rule of damages, if the action is maintained, will be the difference
in value between the retorts actually furnished and such retorts
as should have been furnished. This is the rule when goods are
not furnished for any particular use. Bartlett vs. Blanchard,
13 Gray, 429.
Exceptions sustained.
This case is reported in the forthcoming volume of Mr. Allen's Reports. We
have given a somewhat more extended
head note to the case than that furnished
by the reporter, with a view tQ bring out,
more prominently, the important points
decided by the Court. And to enable the
profession to obtain a more extended and
comprehensive knowledge of the present
state of the law upon the questions disposed of in the judgment, we have been
at the pains to bring together, in a brief
note, the leading cases upon the several
points determined.
I. In regard to contracts made by way
of correspondence, there can be no question they are to be treated as contracts
in writing, the same as if the parties had
reduced them to writing when both were
present. But the precise time at which
the contract thus entered into becomes
binding upon the parties, has been a
great deal discussed. Mr. Justice Chapman here assumes, that "as soon as the
defendants assented to the modifications
stated in the reply, the contract was completed," and we believe the assumption
is well founded. But no question in the

law of contracts has been more strenuously debated, both by the Courts, and
by elementary writers, than this; and
since the discovery of the electric telegraph, there is liable to come in an element of revoking a written offer, which
before did not exist. An offer made in
absolute terms, and dispatched by post,
is considered as irrevocable. If accepted unconditionally, upon its arrival, and
immediate notice of such acceptance dispatched by post, in return, before any
notice of the recall of the offer reached
the person to whom it ws sent, notwithstanding, in the mean time, the party
making the offer had changed his mind,
and had dispatched by post, a letter of
recall, which was received in due course
of mail, but not until after the letter of
acceptance had been sent. Adams vs.
Lindsell, 1 B. & Ald. 681; Dunlop vs.
Higgins, 1 Ho. Lds. Cas. 381; Duncan
vs. Topham, 8 C. B. 225. This is now
the settled rule of the English law.
There are many cases in the books
which have attempted to maintain a different rule, but they have not been satisfactory to the profession, or to the common
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sense of justice; and have, therefore, not
been followed. The case of Cooke vs.
Oxley, 3 T. R. 653, where it was held,
that an offer agreed to be good, if accepted by a given time, was held not binding, has been a good deal discussed, but
has never been well received. And the
case of McCulloch vs. The Eagle Insurance Co., 1 Pick. R. 277, wherein it is
held, that the absolute acceptance of an
unqualified offer to insure at a rate of
premium specified in the offer, is rendered of no binding effect, by the company having dispatched a countermand
of their offer before its acceptance, although not received, until afterwards, by
the plaintiff, has never been regarded as
sound law. Such a view implies, as stated
by Mr. Justice Metcalf, in his well known
and universally admired Essay upon the
Law of Contracts, 20 American Jurist,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, that no contract ever
could become binding, if attempted to be
made by way of correspondence.
The infirmity of all this argument and
attempt at reasoning, against the common sense instincts and innate sense of
justice of every sound mind, is illustrated
by Parker, Ch. J., in McCulloch vs. The
Eagle Insurance Co., 1 Pick. R. 281,
by supposing the letter, on either side,
had been recalled before its arrival, by
ay express outrunning the post, from
which the learned Judge concludes it
must be very obvious the letter must become of no avail, as it clearly would.
And so it has very justly been held, in
regard to an offer recalled, before its
arrival, by a counter telegram. Bank of
the Republic vs. Baxter, 31 Vt. R. 101.
But the learned Judge does not seem to
have here comprehended, that unless the

and the contract, by its terms, becomes

consummated, and any other construction
is virtual bad faith. The cases are very
numerous which adopt this view, and
will be found carefully digested in Perkin's Ed. Chit. on Cont. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.
See also Averill vs. Hedge, 12 Conn. R.
424; Redfield on Railw. 78, 98, 9);
Mactier vs. Frith, 6 Wendell, 116; Hamilton vs. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Barr, 339;
2 Kent. Comm. 477; Tayler vs. Merchants' Ins. Co., 9 How. R. 390,which last
case is directly opposed to 1 Pick. R. 277.
IL In regard to the point that articles
contracted to be furnished for a particular use, must be suited for that use,
it is now perfectly well settled, although
for a long time somewhat questioned,
that there is an implied warranty to that
effect. The authorities are very extensively collated by Bennett, J., in Brown
vs. Sayles, 27 Vt. R. 227-232; Howard
vs. Hoey, 23 Wendell, 350; Gallagher vs.
Waring, 9 Wend. R. 20; Chitty on Cont.
475, and cases cited.
III. The rule of law in regard to the
precise effect of the local usages and
customs of trade and business, in giving
the proper construction to the terms of a
written contract, is extremely indefinite.
But the view presented by the case to
which this note is attached, is, perhaps,
liable to some misconstruction. No reason is given why the usage offered to be
proved in this case is not properly receivable; and the only case cited, and
that with marked approbation, is The
Schooner Reeside, 2 Sumner, 569, where
Mr. Justice Story approves, what he
calls the tendency of modern decisions
to restrict the application of the rule
within the narrowest limits. One might
offer is countermanded before its arrival fairly infer from this, almost, that the
and acceptance, it becomes binding as a Court did not regard this class of evicontract, since by its acceptance, in the dence with any degree of favor. But the
manner and time contemplated by its au- Court clearly did not so intend. There
thor, the minds of the parties thus meet, is no other source from which the Courts
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derive so much aid in the construction of
contracts, since the meaning of all language is made out, mainly, from the implications growing out of theinnumerable
and wholly undefinable additions, -which
all minds naturally and necessarily make
to the mere words in which a contract or
a conversation is expressed. The chief
difference between a terse, clear, and
forcible style of speaking or writing, and
one that is complex, diffuse, and feeble,
consists chiefly in so arranging the elepsis, as that all minds cannot fail to supply
it readily, and always in the same manner. This can only be done by the aid of
a thorough knowledge of the customs and
usages of the language, of the place, and
of-the particular business. In regard to
most of these there will be no controversy, since they are known to all, and
seem natural and familiar, and right.
But when we are offered proof of one
which is new and improbable, and which,
therefore, seems unreasonable, we instinctively resist it. But this resistance
may be more the result of ignorance in
the Courts, than of any clearly defined
principle. We mean, of course, ignorance in regard to the customs of a particular business. For instance, most inexperienced judges, upon being told by
a railway engineer that when he came
so near a herd of cattle upon the track,
that there was no chance to stop the
train before reaching them, or to have
them get off the track, he felt it his duty
to crowd steam to the utmost capacity
of his machinery, would be shocked at the
audacity and temerity of such a man,
and of such a witness. But this feeling
would wholly disappear, upon learning
that this was the only hopeful course to
preserve the lives of the passengers. A
thousand similar illustrations in regard
to the course, the usages, and the laws
of business, in reference to contracts,
might be adduced.

A custom or usage which is unreasonable or in contradiction of the express
terms of the written contract, or which
is only occasional and not universal in
the place and time, will have no effect,
is entirely well settled: Burton'rs. Blin,
23 Vt. R. 151; Clarke vs. Roystone, 13
M. & W.-752; Roberts vs. Barker, 1 Cr.
& i. 808; Boraston vs. Green, 16 East,
71. And even where the terms of a
written contract, by fair implication,
seem to exclude the operation of a usage
or custom, it can have no operation:
Webb vs. Plummer, 2 B. &Ald. 746. And
this is nothing more than the fair application of the rule, that -written contracts
cannot be controlled, or varied by parol
evidence. Proof of usage in particular
trades has been received to show the
secondary meaning of terms, when it is
obvious the terms could not have been
used in their primary sense, but not
otherwise, the Courts feeling bound to
give language its natural signification in
the construction of contracts, unless that
-willlead to absurd consequences. This
is unquestionably opening a wide field
for the discretion of Courts in regard to
the effect of such usages, but it is now
universally adopted in regard to the construction of wills, and other written instruments, as far as we know: Wigram
on Extrinsic Evidence, Prop. iii. p. 42,
and cases cited; Chitty on Cont. 104
et seq.; Redfield on Railw. 52, 53, and
cases cited, and especially the opinion
of Lord Denman, in Humfrey vs. Dale,
7 Ellis & BL. 266. From the opinion of
the learned judge here, and from the
whole course of modern decisions, it is
obvious the tendency is to receive evidence of usage and custom, both local
and general, instead of being narrowed,
is now admitted with more freedom than
the earlier cases would seem to justify.
We admit that this practice, in inexperienced and rash hands, is liable to
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become a dangerous instrument, and one
quite susceptible of abuse. But that is
no reason why it should be discountenanced. There is no good thing which
is not liable to abuse, and often the more
liable, iti proportion to its value. But
this should not induce us to relinquish
it, but rather to study more carefully to
guard against its abuse. The most unfortunate thingin regard to this, as in regard
to all others, is, that men's confidence in
themselves is quite liable to be in the inverse ratio of the confidence of others in
them, so that precisely these men who
require most sedulously to be hedged in
against committing high-handed wrong
and abuse, are those whom it is the most
difficult to restrain. Thus it often happens that the class of men with whom
an extended discretion is least safely to
be trusted, are the very men most ambitious of assuming such an irresponsible
discretion; and on the other hand, those
most capable of its exercise are the least
ready to assume it. So in regard to
judicial discretion in the application of
customary law, those judges who feel
the most entitled to confidence commonly

deserve the least. And while it is said
boni judicis amyliare juridictionem, the
fact of seeking to enlarge one's jurisdiction is more common with bad judges
than with good ones. But the one does
it to secure justice, and the other to
gratify his own conceit, and sometimes
to disappoint the expectations of others;
for personal conceit and vindictiveness
commonly go together.
But with all this ground of argument
so justly open against the introduction
of usage or custom in the exposition of
written contracts, and all contracts, the
rule is nevertheless a wise one, and one
which will be likely to widen as time advances. The great wisdom and the great
difficulty will always be found in defining the exceptions, which will be liable to
be sometimes unjustly multiplied to suit
the tastes of particular tiaen, and as often
unjustly narrowed to meet the supposed
exigency of particular cases. But this
results from the baseness and the infirmities of human nature, and which no human forecast can prevent or effectualiy
restrain.
I. F. R.

In th~e Superior Court of the City of New York.
SAMUEL CARPENTER VS. THE SIXTH AVENUE RAILROAD COMPAN-Y.
1. A collusive settlement of an action, by the parties, to deprive an attorney of his
costs, made after a notice from the attorney, of his claim, to the defendant, will
not be allowed to prejudice the attorney's right to enforce payment of his taxable
costs.
2. His claim for taxable costs will be protected against a collusive settlement in
an action upon a tort merely personal,as well as in an action upon contract; and
as well against a settlement made before trial as after judgment.
3. But an attorney, by an agreement between him and his client, that, besides
taxable costs, he shall receive as a compensation for his services a sum equal to
1 We are indebted for this case, together with the reporter's note and statement

of facts, to Chief Justice Bosworth, for which he will please accept our thanks.£do. Am. Law Rcgistcr.
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one-third of the sum recovered, will not acquire any right in the subject-matter
of such an action, or control over it, which will affect the power of the plaintiff
to settle and release the claimfor damages before a trial has been had.
4. The reported cases in regard to an attorney's lien, or right to be compensated
for his costs, classified and considered.

Before BOSWORTH, C. J., and ROBERTSON and
Heard Feb. 15. Decided March 29, 1862.

MONCRIEF, Js.

Appeal by L. -. Bulkeley, the plaintiff's attorney, from an
order.
The plaintiff was injured on the 21st of September, 1860, by a
collision with one of defendant's cars. About the first of October
1860, it was agreed between the plaintiff and Mr. Bulkeley, by a
written and sealed agreement signed by the plaintiff, that Mr.
Bulkeley should bring a suit to recover damages for the alleged
injury; that he should be paid a retaining fee of $75; and, as said
agreement further states, "he is also to receive from me, (the
plaintiff,) and is empowered to retain out of any moneys received a
sum equal to one-third of the amount recovered or received on
account of such claim, besides the taxable costs of suit, for which
he is to conduct said suit, or compromise, to its termination; but
his fee to be at least $500, unless nothing is received from the
claim." The agreement having been executed, this action was
commenced by Mr. Bulkeley, as plaintiff's attorney; and on the
11th of March, 1861, he served on the defendant a written notice,
signed by him, which states that I (the attorney) "give you notice
that, by virtue of a special instrument in writing, executed by the
plaintiff in this action, I hold a lien upon this suit, for costs, counsel
fees, moneys advanced, &c., to the amount of $500 and upwards,
and that no payment, settlement, or compromise, .in any matter
relating to this suit, or the claims on which it is founded, will be
valid or binding, except made through me personally, or on my
written order."
On the 9th of May, 1861, after the cause had been noticed for
trial, and was about being reached, the plaintiff and defendant settled the action, and for the sum of $150 the plaintiff executed to
the defendant a full release. The defendant then applied to plain-
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tiff's attorney to sign a consent that an order of discontinuance be
entered, and that being refused, moved on an affidavit of the settlement, and on the release, for leave to enter such an order. The
moving affidavits did not allege that there was no motive or intent,
in settling, to deprive the attorney of his costs. The motion was
opposed, on affidavits stating the agreement before mentioned, the
notice to defendant not to settle, and the services rendered. The
Court ordered a reference to a referee, to ascertain and report
"what, if anything, in addition to the taxable costs, would be a
reasonable compensation to the attorney for the plaintiff, for his
services in this action from the time of his retainer to the 21st of
May, 1861." The referee reported the sum of $600. On that
report, and the affidavits previously mentioned, the motion was
heard, and an order was made on the 19th of October, 1861, confirming said report, and granting leave to the defendant to enter
an order of discontinuance, without costs to either party as against
the other. From that order the attorney of the plaintiff appealed
to the General Term.
L. E. Bulkeley, appellant, in person.
John Slosson, for respondent; the defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
BOSWORTH, C. J.-In the following cases, the settlement between
the parties was made after judgment, and after the prevailing party
had given notice of his claim to the costs, as attorney of the party
recovering the judgment, and had forbidden a settlement except
upon the terms of paying to him the amount of his costs. Martin
vs. Hawks, 15 J. R. 405; Power vs. Kent, 1 Cow. 172; -Haight
vs. Holcomb, 16 How. Pr. R. 160, S. C., Id. 173; Ward vs. Syme,
9 H., Id. 16; Sherwood vs. The Buffalo & N. Y. City R. B.,
12 How. 136; Rooney vs. The Second Avenue B. B. Co., 18
N. Y. R. 368.
It was determined, in these cases, that the recovery of the judgment, and notice by the attorney recovering it, to the adverse
party, to pay the costs to him, gave him a lien on the judgment, or
constituted him an equitable assignee of it to the extent of his
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costs, and the attorney was protected against the settlement
subseqtiently made.
In the following cases, a settlement, after judgment, between the
parties, was upheld, the attorney not having given any notice not
to pay to his client, and there being no collusion to defraud him
established. pinder vs. Morris, 3 Oaines R. 165; The People vs.
.fardenbergh, 8 J. R. 335; Graves vs. Bades, 5 Taunton 429;
.3attvs. Smith, 4 B. & Ald. 466; Welsh vs. Hole, 1 Doug. 238.
The cases last cited establish the doctrine, that an attorney
recovering a judgment, has not, merely by reason thereof, a lien
on the judgment, which interferes with the right of the parties to
make, bona fide, any settlement which they may deem expedient.
That it is necessary for the attorney to notify the defeated party
not to pay the costs to his client, to perfect a right to use the judgment to enforce payment of them; and that until such a notice is
given, his client may receive payment or discharge the judgment,
when this is done without any collusion between the parties to
defraud the attorney of his costs.
It being established law that the parties, even after judgment
recovered, may settle it and discharge it, and that the settlement
will be upheld as against the attorney's claim for costs, in a case
free from collusion to defraud him, and where he has omitted to
give notice not to settle without paying to him his costs, it needs
no authority to show that a settlement, under similar circumstances,
can be made before trial, and the attorney left to look to his client
alone for his compensation. This is as far as the court went in
McDowell vs. The Second Av. B. B. Co., 4 Bosw. 670-679. In
that case, no notice had been given by the plaintiff's attorney, and
no intent to defraud the plaintiff's attorney was established, and
the settlement was held to be conclusive against the attorney's
claim for his costs.
There are numerous cases reported where the attorney sought to
proceed in the action to recover his costs, after the parties had settled without his intervention, and where he was held concluded by
it, although there were circumstances of suspicion tending to show
a case of collusion. The language of the cases is, that he must
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make out a clear case of collusion, to justify him in proceeding in
the action, after notice of a settlement of it by the parties: 'Nelson
vs. Wilson, 6 Bing. 568; Clarke vs. Smith, 6 Man. & Gran. 1051;
and Francis, a Pauper,vs. Webb, 7 Com. Bench, 731, illustrate
this proposition. See also Goodrich vs. New, 18 How. Pr. R. 189;
and Owen vs. MITason, Id. 156.
In Tovery vs. Payne, 1 B. & Ad. 660, the defendant compromised with the plaintiff after notice from the plaintiff's attorney not
to do so without his consent. The action was for an excessive distress, and the plaintiff, in support of a rule that the defendants
show cause why they should not pay to the attorney his costs, cited
Welsh vs. Hole, Dougl. 238; Read vs. Dupper, 6 T. R. 361;
Swaine vs. Senate, 2 N. R. 99; and Chapman vs. Bow, 1 Taunt.
341. The rule was obtained onthe grounds, first, that the defendant procured the plaintiff to give a release by surprise and misrepresentation ;. and, second, that he had no right by compromising the
action, to deprive the plaintiff's attorney-of his lien for costs.
The court said, "there was no surprise or misrepresentation in
this case; and the case is to be distinguished from those cited,
as being an action for damages purely unliquidated," and discharged the rule. If a notice by the attorney of a plaintiff to a
defendant, not to settle or comprom.aise an action without his consent, deprives the defendant in all cases of the power of settling it,
except upon the terms of paying the attorney's costs, then Tovery
vs. Payne was decided erroneously; the court, in its decision,
assumed there was a distinction, in regard to the attorney's lien,
between an action for damages purely unliquidated, and the actions
in the cases cited in Tovery. vs. Payne, 1 B. & Ad. 660. The
following brief statement shows the character of the cases cited in
Tovery vs. Payne, supra, and was actually decided:
In Welsh vs. Hole, 1 Douglas 238, the compromise between the
parties and the release of the defendant was, after judgment
recovered, and after defendant had lain in jail two years. The
plaintiff's attorney moved for a rule that the defendant pay his
costs. The motion was denied; the attorney had not given a
notice to the defendant not to settle with the plaintiff.

CARPENTER vs. SIXTH AVENUE RAILROAD CO.

Bead vs. Duvper, 6 T. R. 361, was an action on contract, and
the master, on a reference to him, awarded a certain sum to be
paid to thle plaintiff; together with costs. The plaintiff threatened
to take the defendant in execution, and the latter paid the debt and
costs to the former, after notice. from the plaintiff's attorneys not
to pay to the plaintiff himself, because their bill was not satisfied.
The defendant was ordered to pay to the attorneys their costs. In
Swain vs. Senate, 5 Bos. & Puller 99, an action on contract, the
defendant's bail settled with the plaintiff, the defendant being at
the time in prison, and the court allowed the attorney of the plaintiff to proceed by scire facias against the bail, to collect his costs,
on the ground that the settlement was made to deprive the attorney of his costs; the attorney had not given any notice not to
settle.
In Chapman vs. How, 1 Taunton 341, the attorney proceeded to
judgment in the cause, after the parties had settled, and after being
notified of the fact of the settlement. The settlement was made
3n the 24th of May, after interlocutory judgment and notice that a
writ of inquiry would be executed- on the 27th of May. The attorney had not given any notice of his lien, and there was no intent
to defraud him proved. The judgment and execution were set
aside, and a return of the money levied was ordered.
In this connection, reference may be made to the cases of Cole
vs. Bennett, and Barker vs. St. Quintin, infra.
In Cole vs. Bennett, 6 Price 15, the plaintiff's attorney proceeded
to judgment and execution, after a settlement had been made by
the parties; his proceedings being regular, were sustained, the
court holding, on the facts presented by the affidavits, that the
settlement was collu-vie.
Barker vs. St. Quintin, 12 Mees. & Wels. 441, merely decides
that if a sheriff execute a ca. sa. after the judgment is released
and the plaintiff notifies him not to execute itj he is a trespasser:
that, although the release was given in pursuance of collusion
between the parties to deprive .the attorney of his lien, the sheriff
cannot, even under such circumstances, execute the ca. sa. at the
instance of the attorney, to enable the latter to enforce payment
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of his costs. That if the attorney is, in any way, to obtain the
fruits of that judgment, it must be by an application to the equitable jurisdiction of the court. The sheriff is treated as the mere
agent of the plaintiff, and if he orders the sheriff not to arrest a
party at his suit, he is a trespasser if he subsequently makes the
arrest.
This brief review of the cases cited in Tovery vs. Payne, shows
that there is the distinction between them and that case, on which
the court assumed to act in deciding the latter, and on account
of which it refused relief to the attorney, notwithstanding the
settlement was made after notice from the attorney forbidding it.
But it is the only case within our observation, in which protection
of the attorney has been refused on the ground on which the court
there placed its decision.
The late Supreme Court acted on this distinction, or on an
analogous principle, in The People vs. Tioga C. P., 19 Wend. 732
the court held that a chose in action for a tort merely personal, is
not assignable so that a court of law will protect the assignee
against the fraudulent discharge of the damages recovered in a
suit prosecuted for such tort, although the tort-feazor accept the
discharge with full knowledge of the assignment. From the report
of that case, it would seem that judgment had been entered.
See also 4 Duer 74. If this case is correctly decided, it is difficult to understand how the attorney in the case before us acquired
any lien upon the plaintiff's claim for damages, although he may
be entitled to protection to the extent of his taxable costs. If an
absolute assignment of the cause of action for value to a third
person, would not confer any rights in respect to it which a court
will protect, the attorney would not seem to be in any better condition in respect to the plaintiff's claim for damages, or capable of
acquiring a more indefeasible interest in it.
There is another and a stronger ground for rejecting the attorney's claim to such a right or property in the chose in action on
which the suit is brought, that no settlement of the suit can be
made except with him, and on payment to him of the moneys
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agreed to be paid to effect the settlement, and by way of satisfaction for the damages claimed.
To give such an effect to the agreement between him and his
client, would be to treat him as a purchaser of the whole cause of
action, if the recovery should not exceed $500; or of such interest
in it as will equal the amount of his agreed compensation, if the
recovery should exceed $500; and he would be so treated, although
purchasing with a view to bring a suit upon the cause of action,
thus purchased wholly or in part.
The transaction thus viewed and construed, would be contrary
to public policy, "as well as in violation of a statute of the State,
8 R. S. 478, § 58, [Sec. 71,] 5th edit.
An attorney or solicitor is not permitted to contract with his
client, previous to the termination of the suit, for a part of the
subject-matter of the litigation, as a compensation for his services.
Merritt vs. Lambert, 10 Paige 352, 858, and 2 Denio 607;
Simpson vs. Lamb, 7 Ellis & Black. 84, 92-8.
But, by the agreement between the plaintiff and his attorney in
this case, the latter did not contract, in terms, for an interest in,
or ownership of a part of the subject-matter of the litigation. 'It
was thereby agreed that the attorney should receive from the
plaintiff, and might "retain out of any moneys received, a sum
equal to one-third of the amount recovered or received * * besides
the taxable costs of suit * *; his fee to be at least $500, unless
nothing is received from the claim."
His rights, as against the defendant, cannot be stronger than
if he had contracted with his client for a third part of the entire
recovery, or for the whole of it, if it did not exceed $500. He
cannot by indirection acquire rights as against the defendant, or
a control over the subject-matter of the litigation, which an
express contract, stipulating for a like benefit and interest, would
not confer.
Our conclusion is, that the attorney in this case should be protected for such amount of costs as would be taxable up to the time
of the settlement, in case a recovery for over $50 had been then
had, but that he has no rights which a court will protect in the
27
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plaintiff's claim for damages. The plaintiff had full power over
the suit before trial, to settle the damages on such terms as he
saw fit; although if the settlement had been made after judgment,
and with a view to deprive the attorney of his costs and stipulated
compensation, he might, perhaps, be protected for the whole
amount of the agreed compensation, if the judgment was for a
sum which would cover it. Rooney vs. Second Avenue Bailroad
Company, 18 N. Y. R. 868.
We think it is clearly established, that the settlement in this
case was collusive. It is clear, so far as the plaintiff is personally
concerned, that he settled the suit with the view of cheating his
attorney. The defendants settled, after a notice to them of the
attorney's claim, forbidding a settlement with, or payment of anything to the party. What they agreed to pay and paid, they paid
in disregard of this notice, and no one on behalf of the defendants
testifies that it was not one of the objects of the settlement to
get rid of paying costs which the attorney, as between himself and
his client, had earned, and which it was anticipated he would
collect from the defendants, as a matter of course, if the cause
proceeded to trial.
The attorney's services in a meritorious action, though for a
tort merely personal, are as justly entitled to protection against
fraudulent settlements by the parties, as if rendered in an action
to recover the price of a chattel, or damages for converting it.
And we are not satisfied, that if the attorney of record for
Thomas, in the suit of The People vs. Tioga Com. Pleas, (supra,)
had notified the defendant not to settle, except upon the terms of
paying the costs to him, that a collusive settlement, like the one
in that case, would have been permitted to defeat the attorney's
claim for costs. We do not, therefore, follow the case of Tovery
vs. Payne, (supra), not being satisfied that an attorney is not as
much entitled to protection against collusive settlements in actions
for unliquidated, as in those for liquidated damages.
We think the order appealed from should be reversed and the
order of discontinuance, (if one has been entered,) be vacated; but
with liberty to the defendants to re-enter an order of discon-
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tinuance on paying the taxable costs of the plaintiff's attorney up
to the time he had notice of the settlement of the action, on
the adjustment thereof, by the Clerk, on two days' notice to the
defendants, together with $10 costs of opposing the motion made
at special term, the referees' fees on the reference ordered, and
$10 costs of this appeal.
This disposition of the matter will protect the attorney against
a collusive settlement, to the utmost extent sanctioned by any
adjudged case. It saves to him the costs, taxable in favor of a
prevailing party against the adverse party, and protects the
attorney's right to them, against a collusive settlement, whether
made before trial or after judgment. The authorities support his
claim to this extent and no further.
It enforces the rule that a cause of action for a tort, merely
personal, is not assignable, and the more important rule, that an
attorney cannot be permitted to acquire; by contract made with
his client pendente lite, or before suit brought, and with a view to
bringing the suit, an interest in the subject-matter of the litigation,
which the Court will protect against a settlement by the parties
themselves made before trial.
The order appealed from must be reversed, and the order of discontinuance (if one has been entered) be vacated, but with liberty
to enter an order of discontinuance on the terms above stated.
Ordered accordingly.
The lien of the attorney may be regarded under two aspects; I. General,
IL Specific.
I. The general lien of the attorney extends to all papers which he holds in a
professional capacity. Like other liens,
it depends upon possession of some instrument belonging to the client, or of a
sum of money, or other property to which
he is entitled. Thus he has no lien on a
fund in Court, decreed to his client, beyond his costs in the particular suit; he
cannot claim from such fund the amount
of other costs due to him in other suits.

Lann vs. Church, 5 Maddock, 391; Bozon vs. Bolland, 4 .M. & C. 353. As
Lord Cottenham, in the last case, expresses it; "the lien upon the fund
realized in the suit is confined to the
costs of that suit. This is a lien which
the solicitor is entitled actively to enforce; the right to retain a client's papers tillabill is paid, is of a nature totally
different. It applies to all his bills of
costs, but he cannot actively enforce it. It
is merely a right to retain." Id. If he
refuses to act for the client, it is of little,
if any value; Helsop vs. Metcalf, 3 M.,
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& C. 183; Caligrave vs. Manley, 1 T. &
Rusv.400; Cave vs. Martin, 2 Beav. 584,
586; but if the client unreasonably cease
to employ the solicitor, the latter need
not afford any facilities to the client by
the use of the papers; Lord vs. Wormlington, Jacob, 580. - In Pennsylvania,
the attorney is deemed to have a right to
defalcate or deduct rather than a lien;
Dubois' Appeal, 38 Penn. (2 Wright)
231, (1861.) See Pope vs. Armstrong, 3
Smedes & Marshall, 214. The general
lien of the attorney upon papers depends
wholly upon the fact that they are in
possession: St. John a.. Diefendorff, 12
Wend. 261. Accordingly it has been
held that a creditor who has attached a
jutlgment recovered in favor of the client
a.as
such a right as to prevail over the
general lien of an attorney for the balance due him from his client; Hought
vs. Edwards, 1 Hurlstone & Norman, 171.
"The lien exists by reason of possession, and an attorney has no possession
of a judgment," per Martin, B., 172.
The principal rules governing this lien
appear to be the following:
1st. The claim must have arisen from
professional employment; Worrall vs.
Johnson, 2 Jac. & W. 218. In that case,
it may be held for any general balance
on account. Cases before cited; also,
Douglas, 104, 105, 238; Anon. 12 Mod.
554; Mitchell vs. Oldfield, 4 T. R. 123;
Ex parte Nesbitt, 2 Scho. &Lefroy, 279;
1 M. & S. 535. No motion can be successfully made under the summary process of the Court for a delivery of the
papers, until the entire balance be paid;
Dyer vs. Bowley, cited in Maugham on
Attorneys, 305.
2d. The lien is only commensurate
-with the right which the client, himself,
has; Hollis vs. Claridge, 4 Taunt. 807;
so if the property in the papers is in a
third person, the attorney cannot detain

them for a debt due from the client; Ex
parte Bush., 7 Vin. Ab. 74; Furlong vs.
Howard, 2 Scho. & Lef. 115; Ex parte
Nesbitt, 2 Id. 279; Hoare vs. Parker, 2
Term R. 376.
3d. If the papers be delivered for a
zyecffic purpose, no lien can be created
beyond that purpose; as if deeds are delivered to the attorney, in order that he
may exhibit them to another; Balch vs.
Symes, 1 Turner, 192; or to enable the
attorney to draw a mortgage; Lawson vs.
Dickinson, 8 Modern R. 306. It would
seem, however, that there must be some
agreement or understanding, that they
were delivered for the special purpose
only, or else the lien will attach; Exparte Stirling, 16 Ves. Jr. 258. It is
certain that if, after the object for which
they were given has failed, the attorney
is permitted to retain them, there is a
general lien. Ex parte Pemberton, 18
Yes. 282; 16 Id. 259.
4th. The lien is subject to the equitable
right of set-off between the plaintiff "nd
the defendant. 2 Kent's Com. 641; St.
John vs. Diefendorff, 12 Wendell, 261.
This topic will be more fully noticed
hereafter.
5th. The lien may be waived when the
attorney accepts security from his client.
Cowell vs. Simpson, 16 Yes. Jr. 275.
I1. Specific L ens.-The lien which the
attorney has upon any papers of his
client, for specific professional service,
is of this class. The principles which
govern the case are those prevailing in
other instances of liens for services rendered. Like the lien of a mechanic, it
depends upon possession, and confers no
right in the property, but only a right to
retain it until the claim is satisfied. It
will not be necessary to describe it more
fully. There is, however, another lien
of a particular character, growing out of
the right of an attorney to make a claim
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OIt the results, or the prospective results,
of an action" for his services and disbursements in that very action, which
demands special notice.
1. The nature of this lien.-It is said
by Baron Parke, (Lord Wensleydale,)
•,that the lien which an attorney is said
to have on ajudgment, (which is perhaps
an incorrect expression,) is merely a
claim to the equitable interference of the
Court to have that judgment held as a
security for the debt." Barker vs. St.
Quintin, 12 M. & W. 440. This statement was adopted bk the entire Court
in Hough vs. Edwards, 1 H. & N. 171,
(1856.) So that if the judgment was
fraudulently and collusively released by
the plaintiff with the intent to deprive
the attorney of his lien, he cannot proceed to issue execution, but is driven to
his motion. Id. Applying-to this definition Lord Cottenham's distinction, in
Bozon vs. Bolland, supra, between a
general and specific lien, this result
would be attained. A particular claim
for costs, on the part of an attorney,
furnishes a basis for an application for
equitable relief. A general claim for
costs permits no equitable relief, but the
attorney must rely upon possession. The
older authorities, however, hold that the
attorney must. be deemed an equitable
assignee of the judgment so far as to
protect his claim for costs in the action
in which judgment was obtained. See
also Sherwood vs. Buffalo R. R. Co., 12
How. Pr. R. 136; Haight vs. Holcomb,
16 Id. 160, and cases cited. The recent
English view appears more philosophical,
and in accordance with general principles. See Wright vs. Cobleigh, 1 Foster,
339.
2. When, and under what circumstances,
the Court will actively interfere in the attorney's behalf.
A. After judgment.-The first case
which is usually said to have established

the right, is Welsh vs. Hole, 1 Douglas,
237, per Parke, B., 12 M. & W. 451.
The right, however, would seem to have
been acknowledged at an earlier period.
See 1 Douglas, 105. In addition to the
authorities cited in the principal case,
are Hart vs. Chapman, 2 Aiken Vt. 162;
Foot vs. Tewkesberry, 2 Vermont, 97;
Quimby vs. Quimby, 6 N.. H. 79; Currier
vs. Boston & Maine R. R., 37 N. H.223.
It is entirely clear that notice should be
given to the defendant, by the attorney,
that he shallinsist upon his so-called lien;
otherwise, a settlementmadein good faith
will be binding. Welsh vs. Hole, supra;
Read vs. Tupper, 6 Term R. 361 ; People
vs. Hardenbergh, 8 Johns. 259. It is
not necessary, however, that the notice
should be direct. Any information to
which credit would ordinarily be given,
will suffice. Currier vs. Boston & Maine
R. R., supra; Lake vs. Ingham, 3 Vermont, 158; Young vs. Dearborn, 7 Foster, 324; Abel vs. Potts, 3 Esp. Cas. 242.
The application, by the attorney, to
vacate the satisfaction of the judgment,
should be made at an early period. A.
delay of two years was held to be too
long. Quimby vs. Quimby, supra. The
extent of the lien was originally the taxable costs; but in New York, since the
code which allows the attorney to make
an agreement wi his client for compensation, the lien still exists, and is no
longer measured by the costs. Rooney
vs. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 4 Smith,
368; Ward vs. Syme, 9 How. Pr. R. 16.
In California an opposite view seems to
be entertained. Ex-parte Syle, 1 Cal.
331; Mansfield vs. Dorland, 2 Id. 507.
An attorney has the same lien upon an
award as upon a judgment, especially
where the cause still remains in Court or
a judgment is entered upon the award.
Ormerod vs. Tate, 1 East, 453. See also
Hutchinson vs. Howard, 15 Vermont,
544.
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The lien of an attorney does not extend to a case where he has recovered in
equity, for his own client, land from a
defendant. Smally v8. Clark, 22 Vermont, 598. The allowance of such a
doctrine would establish an equitable
lien or mortgage in opposition to general
principles. S. C., overruling a dictum
in Barnesley vs. Powell, Ambler R. 102.
Nor can a married woman in those states
,where she cannot convey, without the

concurrence of her husband, by her own
act, bind her separate real estate to pay
a solicitor for services or expenditures.
Cozzens vs. Whitney, 3 Rh. Is. R. 79.
The lien of the attorney is not to be
established against the pre-existing
Walker vs.
rights of third persons.
Sergeant, 14 Vt. 247.
B. lBefore judgment.-As a general
rule, the plaintiff must be regarded, during the progress of a suit, as having the
control of it-as being dominus litis.
Something like collusion must be shown
in order to induce the Court to interfere.
This principle has been held to be true
even in the case of pauper plaintiffs. It
was strongly urged to the Court that in
these cases, as the attorney always
looked to the result of the action for his
recompense, a settlement without the
attorney's knowledge must be collusive.
It was held that this view could not be
taken, and as no actual collusion was
proved, the Court refused to set aside the
release which had been given. Jones vs.
Bonner, 2 Exch. 229; Wright vs. Burrows, 3 C. B. 343; Francis vs. Webb, 7
C. B. 731. In other cases it is still more
clear. In Jordan vs. Hunt, 3 Dowl. P.
C. 666, Parke, B., says: "It is quite
competent to parties to settle actions behind the backs of the attorneys, for it is
the client's action and not the attorney's.

Archbold's Practice, 8th ed., 1, ]08; 1
Broom's Practice, 192; Nelson rs.Wilson,
6 Bingh. 568; Clark vs. Smith, 1 D. & L.
960; Anon., I DowI. P. C. 173. If positive collusion is not shown, notice to the
defendant not to settle is, at all events,
necessary to create the right on the part
of the attorney. If a settlement be made
subsequent to notice, it ought usually to
be treated as made by collusion.
The later English decisions and authorities would seem to throw some doubt
upon the distinction taken in Ex parte
Hart, 1 B. & Ad. 660, or in respect to
actions of tort for unliquidated damages.
Thus Jones vs. Bonner, 2 Exch. 229,
was an action of trespass, and it was
remarked that the interference of the

Court was a matter of discretion under
the circumstances of each particular
case. Mr. Cross, in his work on Liens,
says, that a settlement in an action for
unliquidated damages is valid, unless
there be actualfraud, surprise, or inisrepresentation, p. 230. Mr. Broom, however states the rule in the following
language, "Where the action is for damages purely unliquidated, and there has
been no surprise or misrepresentation in
the case, the Court will not, it seems, interfere on behalf of the plaintiff's attorney, although notice has been given that
a settlement must not be made." This
shows that the case is not considered
decisive. 1 Broom's Practice, 192. The
case of Ex parte Hart is, however, cited
with approbation in Hutchison vs. Pettis, 18 Vermont, 614.. If Baron Parke's
view of the nature of the (so called)
attorney's lien is substantiated, many of
the objections to enforcing it in this class
of cases will be obviated. In each case
the question must come before the Court,
and in the exercise of a sound discretion
It must be shown affirmatively that the that which is just may be done.
It is well settled that the Court will
settlement was effected with the view
of cheating the attorney of his costs." not actirelyt aid a party to effectuate a
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settlement, who has not acted in good
faith towards the attorney. Young vs.
Dearborn, 7 Foster, N. H. 324, and cases
cited. The attorney of the defendant has
no such interest in the suit as to prevent
parties from compromising it without his
consent. His right bears no resemblance
to the lien of the plaintiff. Quested vs.
Collis, 10 M. & W. 19.
A distinction of some importance has
been recently taken in respect to the
right of a client to transfer his interest
to his attorney pendente lite. He cannot
make an actual sale;,Simpson vs. Lamb,
7 E. & B. 84; but he can assign his
interest by way of security for services
actually rendered. Anderson vs. Radcliffe, Ell. B1. & Ell. 805; S. C. in the
Exchequer Chamber, Radcliffe vs. Watkin, Id. 817. In both cases verdicts had
been recovered. The last case was an
action of ejectment. It was held that
the "champerty" acts did not affect the
transaction.
C. States of the Union in which the lien
of the attorney is rejected.-Attorneys have
no lien in Missouri; Fressell vs. Hale,
18 Misso. 18; nor in Indiana; Hill vs.
Brinkley, 10 Indiana, 102; nor in Massachusetts or Maine at common law. In
these two latter states it exists by statute.
Decisions are to be found in Potter vs.
Mayo, 3 Greenl. 34; Stone vs. Hyde, 22
laine, 318; Gammon vs. Chandler, 30
Maine, 152; Hobson vs. Watson, 34
laine, 20. The effect of the statute is
to give a lien without notice. There is
now no lien in California; and the decisions in Pennsylvania are apparently
conflicting. Walton vs. Dickerson, 7 Barr,
376; Balsbaugh vs. Frazer, 19 Penn. 95;
and Dubois' Appeal, 38 Penn. 231.
3. The equitable right of set-off.-The
decisions of the Courts in England were
fer a long time at variance upon the
question whether the attorney's lien was
subject to the equitable right of set-off

between the parties. The King's Bench
protected the lien of the attorney; the
Court of Common Pleas and Chancery
rendered it subordinate to the right of
set-off. The decisions are too numerous
to be cited. But now, by general rule,
16 Vict. 1853, no set-off can be allowed
to the prejudice of the attorney's llen.
Simpson vs. Lamb, 7 E. & B. 90; 4
Bligh N. S. 604; 1 Dowl. Prae. 196;
3 Id. 638. The New York decisions have
favored the doctrine of the English Common Pleas. Spence vs. White, 1 Johnson's Cases, 102; Sheppard vs. Watson,
3 Caines, 165; Porter vs. Lane, 8 Johns.
357. Chancellor Walworth held that
when a suit was brought in equity to
compel a set-off of a judgment recovered
in a different action, the Court would
protect the attorney's lien, taking a distinction between claims arising in the
same suit and in different suits; Dankin
vs. Vandenburgh, 1 Paige, 622; Gridley
vs. Garrison, 4 Paige, 647. The distinction was overruled in Nicoll vs. Nicoll,
16 Wend. 446, on account of the express
language of the statutes of set-off. But
when a motion is made to the discretion
of the Court, the attorney's lien will be
protected. Id.; Simpson vs. Lamb, 7 E. &
B 88. The cases in New York, following
Nicoll vs. Nicoll, are disapproved in Currier vs. Boston & Mlaine R. R. Co., 37 N.
H. 223, and seem contrary to principle.
It is well settled that if the judgment
upon which an attorney has a lien, is
assigned, the assignee takes it, cum onere,
and must satisfy the attorney's claim.
In regard to the lien on an appeal, see
Shank vs. Shoemaker, 4 Smith, 489.
4. .Remedies.-In case of a collusive
settlement before judgment, a proper
remedy is to proceed with the suit. Talcott vs. Bronson, 4 Paige, 501 ; Swain
vs. Senate, 5 B. & Pull. 99. The recent
English practice is to move to set the release aside. Jones vs. Bonner, 2 Excheq.

SUCCESSION OF GOURI.
229. In case of collusive settlement after

ral subject see Cross, Montague, and

judgment, a motion may be made to
vacate the satisfaction. Rooney vs. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 4 Smith, 368.
For additional authorities on the gene-

Whitaker on Liens; Maugham & Merrifield on Attorneys, &c. Also, an elaborate case, McDonald vs. Le Roy Napier,
T. W. D.
14 Georgia, 89.

In the Imperial Court of Paris, (Second Chamber.)1
MONS. EUGENE LARNEY, Presiding. January 6, 1862.
SUCCESSION OF GOURIE.
1. The inheritance, whether testamentary or from intestacy of a foreigner, and
especially of an American of the United States, not domiciled in France, must
be regulated as to personal property existing in France, -without excepting the
loans of the State by the law of the country where the foreigner's domicile was,
and where, consequently, his inheritance was unobstructed.
2. This rule, founded upon the maxim mobilia 8eguunturpersonam,has no exception,
except where Frenchmen interested as heirs in the inheritance of a foreigner,
have to defend themselves as to property existing in France against dispositions
or statutes contrary to some one of the essential and fundamental rights rendered
sacred by French legislation, such as the legal reservation, the prohibition of
substitutions, &c.; in which case the right of deduction created by Article 2, of
the law of July 14th, 1819, is open to them.
3. ESPECiALLY: The widow of a citizen of the state of Pennsylvania, married
agreeably to the law of that State, which is also that of the inheritance, and
endowed by virtue of its matrimonial law, with one-half of all the personal property of her husband, has a right to demand in France in opposition to a French
universal legatee, the transfer, by virtue of this title, of the one-half of a rente
inscribed upon the great book of the public debt. (Treaty of Reciprocity between
France and the United States of September 15th, 1853.)

Andrew Gourid, otherwise called Boutard, a Frenchman, left
Fontainbleau, his native city, in 1812, and went to settle in
America, where he practised medicine for a long time. Being a
naturalized citizen of Pennsylvania, in 1850 he mariried an American, at Philadelphia, the place of his domicile, and died there in
1857, leaving a will in his own handwriting, wherein he appointed
his sister, Octavie Gourid, a Frenchwoman, his universal legatee,
Anna Fisher, his widow, legatee of one-third of all his property,
1 Translated and condensed from the Gazette des Tribunaux of January 23d.
1862, by W. D.
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and leaving a legacy of six hundred dollars to the French Society
of Beneficence of Philadelphia.
His estate consisted in America of $1911, and in France, of
two inscriptions of rente due by the State, amounting to 2280
francs, at 4- per cent.
The $1911 were thus distributed in Philadelphia: the widow
Gouri6 renounced the legacy, and claimed by virtue of the laws of
Pennsylvania, the half of this sum. This half, some debts and
expenses being first deducted, was awarded to her. The legacy
to the Society of Beneficence absorbed the surplus; so that the
French universal legatee had no share in this distribution, although
she was not excluded by the legislation of the country, which has
abolished the right of escheat in case of aliens, at least as to
personal property.
This division being made and sanctioned by a decision of the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, the widow Gouri6 required of
Miss Octavie Gouria, the universal legatee, by a suit brought
before the civil Tribunal of Fontainebleau, that a similar division
should be niade of the two inscriptions of rente against the State.
The question in the suit was, whether the widow Gouri6 could
avail herself of the laws of Pennsylvania, and of her renunciation
of the provisions of the will, to assume the character of a doweress,
or whether the will must be supported as being the common title
of the legatees; and consequently, whether the personal estate
in France should be divided agreeably to the provisions of the law
of July 14th, 1819.
The civil Tribunal of Fontainebleau having decided against the
widow, she appealed from their decision to the Imperial Court.
Hfessire Mapu appeared for the widow, and Messire Chaix d'EstAnge, the younger, for the sister of the deceased. After the conclusion of their arguments, Mons. Moreau, the Advocate-General,
submitted his views of the law to the Court in a learned address,
from which the following are extracts:
"We must first attend to the meaning of the law of 1819. By
its second article it imposes upon the right of inheritance in
France, which it grants to foreigners, a restriction which consists
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in a deduction made from the property in France by the French
heir who is joined with a foreigner, of a part equal to that of which
he shall have been deprived in the foreign property of the deceased
by virtue of the law of the country.
This right of deduction is justified by the necessity of maintaining equality between the co-heirs. It could not be that after
having reaped the benefit of such legislation in their own country.
the foreign heirs should pretend to an equal share of the property
in France, and thus to enjoy a privilege at the expense of the
French heir. Mons. Demolombe, and all the authors who have
commented upon the law of 1819, explain it in this sense. They
add that the French law must be applied to the property left by
the foreigner in France, not only in its provisions respecting
successions upon intestacy, but also in its provisions as to the
effect of wills. The right of the legatee or the -appointed heirs
rests in fact upon the law, in successions from intestacy, as well
as in testamentary successions.
But the will Qf Gouri6, in which he bequeathed to his widow
one-third of his personal property, has not been carried into effect
in Pennsylvania, on account of the local law which secures to the
widow the one-half of this same property. Thereby the universal
legatee has beheld her rights curtailed, and she demands indemnification from the French property.
If, then, the law of 1819 were applicable to the inheritance of
the sieur Gourid, the Tribunal of Fontainebleau would have judged
correctly, that by virtue of this law there would have been ground
to the advantage of the sister of the testator, as French heir, for
the deduction of that which, in the Pennsylvania division, the
widow had received over and above the third which had been
bequeathed to her, and to which her share in France should be
proportionably reduced.
But is the law of 1819 applicable ? The first reason against
this application springs from the existence of a treaty between
France and the United States, giving to the citizens of the two
nations a reciprocal right of succession.
The law of 1819 allows foreigners to succeed in France without
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any condition of reciprocity, and the deduction which it imposes
upon the foreigner, benefited by the law of his own country to
the prejudice of the French co-heir, is the sole condition -which it
imposes upon this right of succeeding.
What are the conventiolis existing between the United States
and France as to the inheritances of Frenchmen in America, and
of Americans in France?
The 11th Article of the Treaty of 1778 has ceased to be in
force, as is proved by a resolution of the American Congress,
adopted on the 7th of July, 1798. But, in 1800, there was a new
agreement which re-established the 11th Article of the Treaty of
1778, and limited its duration to eight years.
It is only recently, September 15th, 1853, that a convention,
inserted in the Bulletin of Laws, has provided for the reciprocal
right of Frenchmen and Americans to succeed in both countries.
This convention provides in Article 7, 'In like manner and
always reserving to itself the power of finally applying reciprocity
in the matter of possession and inheritance, the. French government acknowledges the right of citizens of the United States to
enjoy in France, in the matter of real and personal ownership
and of inheritance, the identical treatment which French citizens
enjoy in France in similar matters.'
But, under the government of international reciprocity, there is
no room for deduction; first, because the treaty which alone could
authorize it, contains no provision which allows of it; next,
because deduction belongs only to the system of the law of 1819,
which has provided, diplomatic reciprocity being out of the way
under the government of this reciprocity, that the inequalities of
hereditary emolument which pertain to the difference of legislations, as well as to the comparative importance of the property
which the deceased has left in either State may, as the case may
be, either prejudice or benefit the people of our nation. The
foreigner who comes to inherit in France, by virtue of the treaties,
either suffers himself or benefits by this kind of inequality,
without being able to indemnify himself out of the property in his
own country, in which the French co-heir has the same right as if
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he belonged to that county; just as the foreign co-heir comes upoft
the property in France exactly as if he were a Frenchman. There
is no deduction for any one, both are equally subject, as to inheritance, to the laws of the country in which they succeed; the one
because he is a citizen of that country; the other, because assimilated to him by international law.
We must not say that the treaty of 1853 makes the condition
of Frenchmen worse in preventing the deduction to which they
would be entitled if it were not for the treaty, for in a general
point of view the deduction is compensated for by the advantage
which Frenchmen obtain in becoming capable of inheriting where
they were excluded. Most certainly it is this general interest
which has been the reason for the treaty. Thus it is no longer
the law of 1819, but the treaty of 1853 which should be applied.
The deduction, as well as the diminution of the widow's right to
the third, instead of the half which the American law secures to
her, must be denied to the universal legatee for another reason,
which is that our law of 1819 is only applicable to the foreign
co-heir, and not to the foreigner coming to exercise in the succession a right which is not of a hereditary nature. In effect, the
Pennsylvania statute which the widow Gourid invokes is this: in
the first place, a law called the Intestate Act of April 8th, 1883,
provides for the widow's right to the third of the husband's estate,
if he leaves children; if he leaves only collateral heirs, the widow's
right, independently of the income of half the real estate, is to
half of the personal property in absolute ownership. What must
we call this right of the wife? The statute of 1833 is about to
teach us.
It provides (section 11) for the case of the husband's having
bequeathed one-half of his property to his wife, and to prevent the
benefit of his liberality from being concurrent with the statutory
right of the wife, which might occasion a double outlay, contrary to
the intention of the husband, who might not have explained himself
respecting it in his disposal of his property, the statute declares that
this legacy or donation shall be considered as being in lieu of or in
excltsion of the wife's dower in the property of the said testator, in
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like manner as if he had thus expressed himself in the will. And
the text adds: 'Provided that nothing herein contained shall
deprive the widow of her choice, either of dower or the estate or
property so devised or bequeathed.' An explanatory law of April
11th, 1848, repeats that the widow may take, as she may prefer,
either the legacy or donation left to her by a testament or last will,
or her share in the personal property, by virtue of the said laws
respecting succession or intestacy.
Thus the widow has her share in the property left by the husband, and this share, of which she cannot be deprived by any
disposition made by the man, she takes under the title of dower.
What then, is dower ? Pothier thus defines it. ' The wife's dower
is that which agreement or the law grants to the wife in the property of the husband, for her support, in case she survives him.'
According to Merlin, it was the principal of the nuptial gains and
of survivorship. Is dower, under the dominion of the Pennsylvania
statute, susceptible of the same definition ?
We know that American legislation is, in general, borrowed from
British legislation, and that the latter is itself based upon the principles of the law of the Germans. But Pothier states that the
dower of the French law had the same origin. 'We find it,' says
he, 'in the custom of the ancient peoples of Germany, who established themselves in our provinces. Tacitus relates that, among
these peoples, the wives do not bring any dowry to the husbands,
but receive it from them. This dowry, which the wife received
from the husband, is really the same thing as our dower.'
Having a common origin among the two peoples on this side and
on the other side of the Channel, the almost immemorial institution
of dower, if it sometimes varied in details, and as to the goods
which composed it, was precisely the same as to its principle and as
to its essential character. Thus we read in Blackstone: 'Tenant
in dower is where the husband of a woman is seised of an estate
of inheritance, and dies; in this case the wife shall have the third
part of all the lands and tenements whereof he was seised at any
time during the coverture, to hold to herself for the term of her
natural life.'
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In our days an eminent magistrate of Great Britain has pronounced these words often quoted before the English or American
tribunals: ' There are three things which the common law has
always respected-life, liberty, and dower.'
Dower, therefore, has the same character everywhere; and the
widow does not take by virtue of the right of succeeding, for her
right exists previous to the opening of the succession; it is from
that very time prior to that of the heirs, and, in reality, goes back
to the day of the marriage. It is thus that on account of a right
of widowhood granted by the Customs of Normandy, a decision
of the Court of Cassation of the 29th of livose, in the year VI.,
has said, 'that it was irrevocable in its nature; that it was not in
the power of the wife to abridge it, or to modify it, or to derogate
from the disposition of the municipal law, upon the faith of which
the marriage has been contracted; that we must not confound the
rights acquired by the married couple by means of the marriage,
with the mere rights of succession which the laws do not decree
but at the moment of the opening of the succession.' ,
Let us add, that dower often takes effect upon the real estate
alienated by the husband, even to the prejudice of third parties
purchasers. Armed with a right of this character, cannot the wife
avail herself of it semper et ubique, according to Dumoulin's
expressian, defining the effects of the matrimonial compact, express
or implied? Undoubtedly not, if dower is a right confined to real
estate. But it is different as to dower in personal property, of
which Boullenois (Treatise upon Statutes, vol. 2, page 274) has
said, after having admitted, for this supposition, the system of
implied contract which, on the contrary, he rejects when dower in
real estate is in question: 'It is a debt relating to personal property with which, at the instant of the marriage, the law of the
matrimonial domicil charges the married couple. This debt is,
indeed, in yendenti, because it is uncertain which of the two will be
the survivor; but death having happened, the right of the survivor
is fully secured, and goes back to the moment of the marriage.'
Boullenois is also the author who has furnished the most solid
foundations for the maxim, Mobilia sequuntur personam. From
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this maxim, as we have seen, article 2 of the law of 1819
derogates in a way that was necessary. But, outside of this law,
the maxim ought to preserve its authority; it ought especially
when it serves to give to the matrimonial compact all the consequences of which it admits according to equity and the law of
nations.
Here the widow Gouri6 claims the benefit of the essential condition of the marriage. The personal statute gives her a dower in
the personal property; she can demand it wherever her husband
has left property of this sort; we say the personal statute, for the
movable property connected with the person is regulated as to the
right of disposal by the laws which govern it. The implied contract of the married couple having been that dower should attach
to the movables left by the husband, how can his universal legatee,
who represents him, escape from that contract? Why should
the French law desire to oppose the execution of such an agreement when our statute as to real estate is "inno degree affected
by it; when there is nothing at stake but some interests in personal property, some rentes upon the State, which have no other
character ?
In short, gentlemen, that is a doctrine as just as it is generous,
which, in personal property at least, makes the conventional
or quasi-conventional rights of wives independent of territories
and sovereignties. It belongs to you to proclaim it. Besides,
we shall thereby escape the danger of reprisals, which, according
to times and places, might threaten the rights of French widows,
claiming them in foreign countries, no longer in customary
dower, since that is abolished by the Code Napoleon, but in
the stipulated dower, which, like the gain of survivorship, can
still, under the government of this code, find a place in contracts
of marriage.
We think, for these reasons, that there is cause for annulling
the decision of the former Judges, and for ordering that the
widow GouriM shall take for her dower the half of the rentes of
2280 francs."
After having deliberated, the Court gave judgment as follows:

SUCCESSION OF GOURIt.

"The Court, considering that Edme Auguste Andr6 Gouri6,
otherwise called Joseph Boutard, a Frenchman by birth, but a
naturalized citizen of the United States, in the State of Pennsylvania, on the 21st of January, 1850, married at Philadelphia, for
his second wife, and without marriage settlement, Anna Fischer,
at present his widow;
"That the said Gourid died at the same place, without issue, on
the 7th of March, 1857, leaving a will in his own handwriting,
dated the 80th of March, 1853, in which, after having left to his
wife his furniture and a third of all his real and personal estate,
wheresoever situated, and a sum of six hundred dollars to the
French Society of Beneficence of the city and county of Philadelphia, he has appointed, as his universal legatee, his sister, Octavie Gourid, residing in France and remaining a Frenchwoman;
" Considering that the widow, Gourid, has immediately renounced the advantages resulting to her from the will, to avail
herself of the right which, in her capacity as widow, the statute
of Pennsylvania authorized her to enforce against the inheritance
of her husband; that is to say, to the half in full ownership of all
the personal property depending upon it;
" Considering that the competent judicial authority, the
Orphans' Court of Philadelphia, has, by decision of the 19th
of November, 1858, awarded to her this half, some debts and
costs being deducted, of the part of the personal estate, which
was in America;
"Considering that there is in France, and depending upon the
inheritance of Gouri6, some other personal property, especially
two inscriptions of rente at 43 per cent., amounting together to
2280 francs of rente, upon the great book of the public debt, the
half of which, in full own*ership, the widow, Gourid, has claimed
before the civil tribunal of Fontainebleau, in the same capacity
and by the same title by which she had proceeded before the
jurisdiction of Philadelphia;
" Considering that the former judges, giving effect to the will
of Gourid, have allowed her claim only with restrictions, upon the
ground that the French law governs all the personal property left
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in France by a foreigner, especially the rentes inscribed upon the
great book of the public debt, and because, according to the terms
of the law of the 14th of July, 1819, there was reason to make,
for the benefit of the universal legatee, Octavie Gouri6, a deduction from the value of the rente in question, equal to that by
which she found herself debarred from the personal property in
America, owing to the modification made by the -Pennsylvania
statute in the will of Gouri6;
"But considering that, according to the maxim mobilia secquuntur
personam, it is a principle that personal property, whatever may
be its nature, is, as to the right of disposing and receiving, subject
to the personal statute of those to whom it belongs ; that it follows that an inheritance, whether testamentary or from intestacy,
proceeding from a foreigner not domiciled in France, and consisting of personal property existing in France, should be regulated by the la'w of the country where this foreigner had his
domicile, and where, consequently, his inheritance is open;
"Considering that, if this principle is sometimes found modified by the interpretation which jurisprudence and erudition have
given to the law of the 14th of July, 1819, it is especially, when
Frenchmen, interested as residuary heirs in the inheritance of a
iforeigner, had to defend themselves upon the property existing in
France against disposals or statutes opposed to some of the essential and fundamental rights consecrated by French legislationsuch as the legal reservation, the prohibition of substitutions outside of settled cases, &c. ; but that it could not be thus in a case
where the universal legatee, who cailnot avail himself of any legal
reserve, finds himself opposed, not to a foreign co-heir, but to a
jokit-owner of a part of the property of the inheritance, who
comes to exercise upon that existing in France, rights which she
derives from her personal statute, and from that of the domeile of
the deceased at the same time as from the 7th Article of the
interposed treaty of the 15th of September, 1853, between France
and the United States, by the terms of which, by way of reciprocity for the analogous concessions made to Frenchmen, the citi28
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zens of the United States may possess in France personal and
real estates in the same manner as the people of this country;
" Considering as to the right resulting from the personal statute
in favor of the widow, Gouri6, that it appears from the documents
produced, that, in Pennsylvania, under the government of the common law, which is the separation of property, the wife, on the
death of her husband, without leaving issue, has the right to claim,
among other things, the half of his personal estate;
" Considering that, foreseeing the case of the husband's leaving
a legacy to his wife of less importance, a law of the 11th of April,
1848, in derogation of that of the 8th of April, 1833, has reserved
to the widow the choice between the enforcement of the legacy
and the right of taking that portion of the inheritance of the
husband, and that the power is acquired by her in so complete
and absolute a way that the husband cannot affect it by any disposal, whether testamentary or otherwise;
" Considering that this advantage, which, under the name of
dower, the statute of Pennsylvania has made a tacit matrimonial
compact, has the same origin and the same cause as the customary
dower of the old French law, and which in a similar manner
establishes in favor of the widow, upon the goods of her husband
which are subject to it, a right of property virtually pre-existing
the day of the death, but which does not become effectual until
that time;
"Considering that, as has been said, the widow Gourid has
renounced the will to stand by her dower, and that by virtue of the
peremptory decision given between her and the French Society of
Beneficence of Philadelphia, on the 19th of October, 1858, her
title of universal legatee appears to be legally and regularly turned
into that of doweress and owner of half of all the personal property composing her husband's succession; that it is, therefore,
with good right that she now demands, in the same proportion, the
ownership of that property existing in France, without any deduc.
tion being made, for the benefit of the French universal legatee,
in the terms of Article 2 of the law of the 14th of July, 1819,
since, from the causes above mentioned, it results that there is no

